El objetivo que dirige este artículo es esbozar el modo en que, desde la filosofía para niños, es pensable un ejercicio crítico de la identidad y, a partir de ello, promover una revitalización del mundo político, entendido desde el concepto arendtiano de acción. Revelar los marcos referenciales y, una vez puestos de relieve, someterlos a una crítica dialógica, comunitaria, supone la posibilidad ―quizás utópica― de proyectar desde la niñez y construir a futuro un mundo digno de ser vivido. La metodología (...) utilizada es cualitativa, de corte hermenéutico. En el primer apartado se desglosa el concepto tayloriano de identidad en su vínculo con los marcos referenciales y la idea de bien. En el segundo acápite nos concentramos en el doble concepto arendtiano de mundo, como mundo circundante y como trama política. Finalmente, y tomando como punto de partida los análisis de Lipman, se esboza el carácter político de la filosofía para niños, entendiendo aquí lo político con Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

The article develops a dialogue between the works of Marx, Husserl and Heidegger, about the problem of mathematization in its double perspective: scientific and economic. At first, we show the way in which ideation as well as real abstraction involve a forgetting of the world of life will be exposed. In a second moment, we will focus on the dissolution of the gold standard and on fictitious capital, to show the contemporary expression-in an economy obsessed with the reproduction of abstract (...) wealth-of the aforementioned oblivion. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene por propósito exponer —desde las consideraciones de Nancy y Kant—, el modo en que la libertad sólo puede ser pensada en su plena radicalidad, cuando es asumida desde una clave histórica. Aunque Nancy critique a Kant la identificación de Idea y Libertad, reconoce en el filósofo de Königsberg el haber visualizado un «más allá de la idea». El «más allá», de acuerdo a Nancy, es ubicado por Kant simplemente en la realidad objetiva de la idea de (...) libertad. A nuestro juicio, dicho «más allá de la idea» se incrusta y nutre de las reflexiones históricas y jurídicas kantianas. Este hecho, permite crear un terreno común para el diálogo entre la posición kantiana y la fenomenológica: libertad e historia constituyen una unidad indisoluble. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be (...) worked in also, because, after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

Las primeras imágenes cinematográficas rodadas por los estadounidenses en Cuba se remontan a la Guerra Hispano cubana norteamericana, anterior al surgimiento de Hollywood y su consolidación como industria del espectáculo. Los filmes producidos en esta etapa constituyen el preámbulo del denominado cine de propaganda política que, según el historiador Román Gubern, ha llegado hasta la actualidad y, sobre todo, develan el carácter manipulador que desde sus inicios ha tenido el lenguaje cinematográfico. Entre las décadas del `30 y `40 los filmes (...) realizados por Hollywood en la isla han proyectado una imagen exótica y estereotipada sobre la identidad cubana. No solo se ha desvirtuado nuestra memoria histórica, sino también nuestros valores identitarios, imagen que se ha extendido hasta el contexto actual.En la extensa historia del cine hollywoodense no son pocas las cintas que han abordado aspectos de nuestra historia. Independientemente de la calidad de la gran mayoría de estos filmes, no se puede minimizar su importancia en el obsesivo intento por construir una imagen creíble y veraz sobre Cuba. Aunque la gran mayoría de las cintas realizadas por cineastas estadounidenses sobre la isla se encuentran limitadas por el hecho de haberse rodado en espacios y locaciones de otras naciones con semejanzas geográficas y culturales con Cuba, dicha limitación no es sinónimo de pobreza artística. El objetivo fundamental de este ensayo radica en el análisis de la representación de la imagen e identidad de Cuba en la industria de Hollywood, a partir del estallido de la Guerra Hispano-cubana-norteamericana el 15 de febrero de 1898 hasta la administración del presidente Barack Obama, período histórico conocido como el Deshielo, porque ambas naciones decidieron restablecer relaciones diplomáticas interrumpidas en plena Guerra Fría, específicamente en 1961. (shrink)

The objectives of the present study were to adapt a grief intervention program to family caregivers of patients with dementia, and assess its effectiveness in improving the symptoms of grief and other health-related variables. The intervention was based on Shear and Bloom's grief intervention program, with the necessary adaptations for use in the grieving process for a family member's illness. A total of 52 family caregivers of individuals with dementia participated. They were evaluated using a battery of self-report measures assessing (...) grief, overload, resilience, post-traumatic growth, experiential avoidance, health-related quality of life, and benefits of care. The results suggest that the program is effective in improving grief symptoms, caregiver burden, resilience, post-traumatic growth, and quality of life of family caregivers. It is necessary to create and implement interventions targeting caregivers' feelings and manifestations of ambiguous grief, because there is a lack of programs providing an efficient solution for the mental and physical health of caregivers, and because of the human and socioeconomic cost involved in neglecting this group. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of sound individuation (SI) and its connection to sound ontology (SO). It is argued that the problems of SI, such as aspatiality, extreme individuation, indexical perplexity and duration puzzles are due to SO’s uncertainties. Besides, I describe the views in SO, including the wave view (WV), the property view (PV), and the event view (EV), as Casey O’Callaghan defends it. According to O’Callaghan, EV offers clear standards to individuate sounds. However, this claim is countered by (...) the consideration that any view could also defend the standards in SO, and thus, EV does not solve any of the problems mentioned above. As a way of showing the difficulties inherited by sound’s inner ontology, the problem of its linguistic representation is also addressed. The problem of SI can be developed within the frame of the philosophy of language and, specifically, regarding the discussion about mass vs count-­sortal terms. Is the term sound a mass or a count­-sortal? It is shown that, for reasons pertaining SO, the decision regarding the case of sound as a mass or count-­sortal term remains open. SI is, thus, covered from the SO to the philosophy of language. (shrink)

You see, I'm not really a thinker. I am a literary man and I have done my best to use the literary possibilities of philosophy, although I'm not a philosopher myself, except in the sense of being very puzzled with the world and with my own life. But when people ask me, for example, if I really believe that the cosmic process will go on and will repeat itself, I say I have nothing at all to do with that. I (...) merely tried to apply the aesthetic possibilities, let's say, of the transmigration of souls or of the fourth dimension to literature and see what could result from them. But really, I would not think of myself as a thinker or a philosopher. And I follow no particular school. (shrink)

In the year 1855, American Literature made two experiments. The first, quite a minor one, the blending of finished music with sing-song and Red Indian folklore, was undertaken by a considerable poet and a fine scholar, Longfellow. The name of it, Hiawatha. I suppose it succeeded, as far as the expectations of the writer and of his readers went. Nowadays, I suppose it lingers on in the memory of childhood and survives him. Now the other is, of course, Leaves of (...) Grass. Leaves of Grass is a major experiment. In fact, I think I can safely venture to say that Leaves of Grass is one of the most important events in the history of literature. If I speak of it as an experiment, perhaps you will think that I am implying a profanation, a desecration, and a blasphemy, since, when we speak of experiments in literature, we generally think of unsuccessful ones. For example, when we speak of experimental literature, well, we think of works that we do our best to admire and that somehow defeat us because, after all, the word "experiment" is a polite word. Well, in the case of Leaves of Grass the experiment succeeded so splendidly that we think it could never have failed. Somehow when something goes right - and that hardly ever happens in literature - we think it somehow inevitable. We think that Leaves of Grass lay there, lay unsuspected there, ready for anybody to discover and write it down. (shrink)

This vision of universal solidarity, Nobo demonstrates, is the fundamental metaphysical thesis whose truth the categories and principles of Whitehead's philosophy were expressly designed to elucidate.

Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the audible (...) qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper’s intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework. In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses— namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (Raumlichkeit and Zeitlichkeit, respectively) of both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation. (shrink)

Este artículo busca demostrar que, a partir de los lineamientos presentes en el capítulo II del reciente _Reprise du donné_ es posible proponer cuatro niveles de hermenéutica que nos permiten resolver algunos de los problemas de la fenomenología marioniana lúcidamente planteados por Christina Gschwandtner.

Resumen Me propongo aclarar la noción de “fenómeno” de Jean-Luc Marion y su relación con la categoría de “fenómeno saturado”. Para ello discutiré las interpretaciones de algunos comentaristas que advierten tensiones entre la primera y la segunda tópica del fenómeno.I aim to clarify Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of “phenomenon” and its relationship with the category of “saturated phenomenon”. To this end I discuss the interpretations of some commentators who point out tensions between the first and the second topic of the phenomenon (...) presented. (shrink)

La llamada _nouvelle phénoménologie_ ¿practica efectivamente una fenomenología? Este artículo se propone demostrar, a partir de un análisis de las propuestas de sus dos autores más representativos: Jean-Luc Marion y Claude Romano, que las obras de estos filósofos constituyen una auténtica fenomenología si se tiene en cuenta el particular estatuto que le otorgan a la instancia antepredicativa.

In the realm of the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience there is an ongoing discussion concerned with the nature of sounds. One of the contestant views within this ontology of sound is that of the Property View, which holds that sounds are properties of the sounding objects. A way of developing this view is through the idea of dispositionalism, namely, by sustaining the theory according to which sounds are dispositional properties (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017). That portrayal, however, (...) is not sufficient, as it has not inquired the metaphysical debates about dispositions beyond the conditional analysis. In this paper, I try to advance this view by including recent developments (for instance Bird 2007; Vetter 2015) in the field of dispositionalism and I analyse whether this new version can sort out known and new objections to Property View. (shrink)

¿Cuál es el estatuto de la reducción en la obra de Marion? Este artículo se propone aclarar esta operación fundamental en la fenomenología de la donación estableciendo su relación con la epoché entendida heideggerianamente como tonalidad afectiva fundamental.